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Abstract. Objectives: The central aim of this paper is to determine as accurately as possible the 
nature, extent and cost of vat carousel fraud to the public and private sectors within the European 
community. Prior Work: The European Union (EU) Institutions and Member states have put forward 
several measures to tackle this problem, although some of these have placed a disproportionate 
burden on business.  A lot of countries have imposed distinct measures to combat VAT carousel fraud 
and important lessons have been emerged about their efficiency and compliance. Approach: The 
methodology takes a comprehensive review of prior research evaluating real evidence of VAT 
carousel fraud and analysing attempts by the European Union to tackle effectively VAT carousel 
fraud. Results: The study concludes that the possible solutions are in the field of closer cooperation 
and understanding among related parties as well as the application of combined restrictive measures. 
Implications: The study has implications to the society, managers and policy makers.  The results will 
aid national authorities to implement and share best practice to combat VAT carousel fraud with other 
national governments. Value: Confronted with the drastic increase of VAT carousel fraud, the 
European Commission identified the urgent need of a coherent strategy to combat it.  Yet, neither the 
literature nor the practices of tax and law enforcement have addressed the threat adequately. This 
study research gives approaching solutions to delineate essential procedures and principles to embark 
upon VAT carousel fraud. 
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1 Introduction 
European VAT fraud is growing at an alarming rate- both in its quantum and its 
level of sophistication – to the point that it is today beginning to affect the accuracy 
of Member states’ trade statistics.  Estimates vary concerning the actual level of 
VAT losses, with figures ranging from €20 billion to €35 billion per annum for all 
member states (Borselli, 2011). Whatever the actual level of fraud, these figures 
highlight the urgent need for Europe to address the issue of the reform of the VAT 
system.   
 
The suppression of fiscal borders in the EU has allowed businesses to purchase 
goods and services cross-border without being charged VAT.  This is the source of 
much of the missing trader intra-community (MITC) fraud, or carousel fraud, 
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predominantly achieved using mobile telephones and computer chips as a conduit 
to facilitate the fraud. 
Member states have introduced their solutions in order to tackle VAT carousel 
fraud.  Whilst the distinct measures focus on addressing VAT fraud, it is 
regrettable that to date the solutions put forward by Member states, appear to have 
been drawn up without significant levels of coordination. This lack of coherence 
and coordination reduces the effectiveness of the measures, places an extreme 
burden on legitimate businesses and acts to the detriment of Europe’s 
competitiveness as a whole (International VAT Association report, 2007).  
The goal of this work is to attempt to value and assess the actual level of VAT 
carousel fraud within the EU by reviewing all the academic literature and a variety 
of reports.  The central aim of this study is to determine as accurately as possible 
the nature, extent and cost of fraud to the public and private sectors.  
As a conclusion, a drastic change in the VAT system might provide a robust 
defense, where enhancing risk management and exchange of good practices is 
essential.  Furthermore, recommendations of appropriate strategies to facilitate the 
comprehensive and consistent recording of data on fraud, is given in the final 
section of this article. 
 
2 Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud and Carousel  Fraud 
Missing trader intra-community (MITC) fraud, of which carousel fraud is the best 
example, exploits the refund of VAT to exporters to milk the VAT system of 
revenues through a series of contrived transactions (Keen and Smith, 2006).  
Studies by Ligthart (2006) and Needham (2006) explained that MITC or carousel 
fraud occurs when a registered trader imports commodities from a supplier in 
another EU member country, invoices and collects VAT at home but fails to remit 
the tax to the home authorities.  By the time the tax authorities have detected the 
fraud the company has already disappeared.   
The two key features of the VAT that are exploited in the carousel fraud are the 
VAT zero-rating of exports and the system of deferred payment for VAT on 
imports, adopted in the EU since the removal of fiscal frontiers in 1992 (HM 
Customs and Excise Report, 2002; OECD Economic Survey: United Kingdom 
Report, 2007).  Under deferred payment, VAT on imports from one member state 
into another is levied not at the border but at the time of the importer’s next 
periodic VAT return.  As a result, there may be a considerable time lag between the 
date at which the importing company (Company B) imports the goods and the time 
at which the VAT authorities seek payment of the VAT due.  In the mean time, the 
goods are sold, via complicit-or perhaps unwitting-‘buffer’ companies in the UK, 
to company D, which exports the goods, claiming a refund of the VAT that it paid 
when purchased the goods from company C.  
Although VAT carousel fraud is often committed involving intra-Community 
transactions, carousel fraud does not necessarily depend on the presence of a cross-
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border transaction in the chain of supplies. Carousel fraud may also be committed 
by the supplier in domestic transactions if he collects VAT on sales from the 
purchaser and simply does not remit the VAT to the tax authorities. In addition to 
fully domestic carousel fraud, the EU has seen a rise in cross-border carousel 
frauds where the cross-border supply comes from a non EU country (Tumpel, 
2007). 
As the above research prevail, the scale of the fraud is outsized and it is well 
known that the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee as well as the European Commission indicated a need to develop a 
coordinated strategy to improve the fight against fiscal fraud.  As a conclusion, the 
most pressing need seems to be for a VAT strategy that will effectively deal with 
MTIC or carousel fraud (Ainsworth, 2008). 
 
3 Evidence of VAT Carousel Fraud 
3.1 The UK 
Ruffles et al (2003) gave light on the impact of VAT carousel fraud on the Balance 
of Payment Statistics and UK National Accounts.  They have explained that this 
type of fraud impacts on intra-EU trade statistics as they are collected via the VAT 
system.  Whilst carousel transactions are captured in export data, the acquisition of 
the goods in MITC frauds is not included in import data.  Imports are, therefore, 
under-recorded. They have concluded that this fraud is also a factor contributing to 
the recent widening asymmetry between the UK and other EU Member States’ 
trade data. 
Considerable attention has to be specified when UK economists were surprised by 
an unexpected trade gap in figures released by the Office for National Statistics in 
July 2005.  The gap had widened by almost £1 billion in a single month, leading 
some to believe that carousel fraud had distorted the figures.  Additionally, 
statistics issued by HM Revenue and Customs one year later, indicated that VAT 
fraud had reached record levels, where criminal activity accounted for £7.4 billion 
in the last quarter alone (National Audit Office Report, 2006). 
UK government has published annual estimates of VAT losses/gap, based on a 
comparison between actual VAT receipts and an estimate, largely from National 
Accounts data on household spending, of the hypothetical VAT revenue that would 
be obtained with full compliance: the ‘theoretical total VAT liability’.  In the year 
2005-06, the VAT losses amounted to £12.4 billion or a percentage of 14,5 VAT 
gap.  The estimates for this latter year show a marked reversal of the downward 
trend and a sharp jump of nearly £3 billion in the amount of revenue lost compared 
with the previous year (The IFS Green Budget, 2007; The United Kingdom 
Parliament Report, 2007).  
Moreover, Borselli (2011) concluded that the average of MITC frauds with respect 
to the UK VAT gap over the period 2000-2010 ranges between 11% and 19,4%.  
Applying these percentages to the overall EU-27 VAT gap in 2009 we get an 
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estimate of an annual amount of MITC frauds ranging between €13 and €23 
billion. 
For the last decade, in the UK, levels of MITC fraud have risen since it was 
identified and measured between 2000 and 2010 (HM and Revenue Customs 
Report, 2011).  However, like any criminal activity its nature makes it difficult to 
measure, Table 1 below, presents this type of fraud with a variety of different 
estimates of the size of the activity.  MITC fraud impact on VAT receipts ranged 
from £0,5 billion to £3,5 billion whereas over the same period the percentage of 
MITC fraud in relation to the overall VAT gap ranged between 8,8% and 22,9%.  It 
is crucial to conclude that the percentage of VAT fraud in relation to VAT gap has 
declined dramatically over this ten year horizon. 
Table 1. MITC Fraud Estimates 
Year MITC fraud and % of 
VAT gap 
2000/2001 18% 
2001/2002 19% 
2002/2003 16% 
2003/2004       14,50% 
2004/2005       15,50% 
2005/2006       22,90% 
2006/2007 17% 
2007/2008 11% 
2008/2009     10,50% 
2009/2010      8,80% 
  Source: HM Revenue and Customs (2011) 
 
3.2 Other European Union countries 
VAT is a significant part of total revenue for the EU member states accumulating 
to 13 to 22 percent of total annual revenue (Brederode, 2008). Unfortunately, the 
current EU VAT system is extremely vulnerable with respect to MITC or carousel 
fraud.  This vulnerability is primarily due to the fact that the exchange of 
information between member states of the EU is slow, often too slow to expose 
fraudsters before they have disappeared again as the fraudulent, fictitious 
companies set up by these malicious persons only exist for a period of between 
three and six months (Kerremans et al, 2005). 
PwC in their report in September 2006 submitted evidence in relation to the 
carousel fraud within the EU.  They have enlightened that carousel fraud has led to 
a number of outcomes that have a negative impact on the efficiency of the 
economy including the following: extra administrative burdens for both businesses 
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and the tax authorities, delays in receiving legitimate VAT repayments as well as 
the creation of transactions with no economic benefits.  After four years,  by 
estimating the missing values for other EU countries and adjusting for 2009 
calculated that the VAT gap for the EU-27 came to about €119 billion euro in the 
late 2009 (PwC report, 2010). 
It has been declared that the explosion of carousel fraud is costing the EU the same 
as the total common agricultural policy spending, and even five times more than 
expenditure on employment and social affairs (G4S International, 2007).  Anderson 
and Franzen (2008) went one step further to quarrel that carousel schemes deprive 
the Member States a great deal of tax revenues since investigations prove that up to 
100 billion euro disappear every year. 
These wider economic impacts, in addition to the misappropriation of government 
funds, create compelling reasons for the development of policies/proposals that 
will effectively deal with carousel fraud.  The next sub-sections provide us with 
substantive evidence of distinct European countries and the impact of VAT 
carousel fraud to their economies.  The list of countries can go on but the most 
critical cases were presented beneath. 
3.2.1 Carousel fraud and Austrian economy 
Every year, tax auditors detect cases of carousel fraud worth 50 to 100 million euro 
in revenue loss.  If the goods that are traded in carousels actually find their way 
into normal sales outlets, the result is a distortion of competition, as such goods can 
be sold below customary prices since profits are made in the form of  VAT 
received but not passed on to the tax office (Federal Ministry of Finance report, 
2007). 
3.2.2 Carousel fraud and Sweden economy 
A report of the Swedish Tax agency published in October 2007 presented estimates 
of the overall tax gap in Sweden.  According to these estimates, 26 per cent of the 
gap related to VAT where the VAT gap came to a level of around SKR 35 billion; 
this contrasts with the considerable lower top-down estimate of SKR 4.1 billion in 
2001 and of SKR 1.6 billion in 2002. 
3.2.3 Carousel fraud and German economy 
Nam and Parsche (2007) estimated German VAT losses for the period 1997-2007. 
From their analysis they have reported that the VAT gap for 2005 was 17 billion 
euros, for 2006 15 billion euros and, for 2007 14 billion euros.  It is important to 
perceive the decrease in the VAT gap for 2007 despite the increase in the German 
VAT standard rate from 16 to 19 percent from 1 January 2007. 
It is clear that the German VAT compliance landscape has changed dramatically 
the last years as the German enforcement is far more stringent than in other 
countries (Ainsworth, 2011). 
3.2.4  Carousel fraud and French economy 
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The French Auditors report (2007) on tax fraud integrated new estimates obtained 
by extrapolating data from inspections, using a stratified extrapolation method to 
reduce the bias due to risk-based targeting of inspections.  The results of the report 
expose figures of 7.3 to 12.4 billion euro for VAT.  As a matter of consequence 
from the VAT carousel fraud, the French balance of trade (exports minus imports) 
was overstated.  The main reason for this effect is the fact that the measure of 
foreign trade transactions is based on VAT returns (Cachia, 2007). 
 
3.3  Conclusive remarks 
There needs to be an increasing global awareness of the term carousel (or MITC) 
fraud.  It should be recognised as theft on a grand scale, not tax evasion, and 
therefore treated as a serious crime.  The next section of this work recommends 
different proposals/measures to combat VAT carousel fraud. 
 
4 Proposals to Counter VAT Carousel Fraud 
4.1 Tackling VAT carousel fraud: Actions to date 
As part of the wider international strategy, negotiations are continuing with 
European partners to secure derogation necessary to introduce new systems most 
commonly used to tackle VAT carousel fraud. 
Inland Revenue’s approach in the past years has focused on a ‘means of 
knowledge’ test involving extended verification; employees conducted lengthy and 
far-reaching enquiries into every constituent part of each transaction chain, 
examining whether frauds have occurred and whether other participants in the trail 
could have known of it (European Union Committee report, 2007).   
Marquez (2010) has evaluated that it has long been one of the main goals of the tax 
commissioner to conquer tax fraud, particularly VAT carousel fraud. To avoid 
carousel fraud, a definite VAT system must be implemented based on the taxation 
of goods and services in the member state of origin. 
While the above mentioned strategies are in operation, proposals have broadened to 
include co-operation with other EU Member States as well as advancement with 
the technological facets. 
4.2 Effectiveness of existing measures to fight VAT Carousel fraud 
Steve Botham, for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (2007), put it 
to us succinctly that none of them were aimed at stopping the fraud as they were all 
aimed at making it more difficult to penetrate the fraud and further to pass the 
liability to other people who were dealing with fraudulent traders. 
Summarising, it has been stated that VAT carousel (or MITC) fraud constitute the 
largest single source of fraudulent VAT losses for the Inland Revenue authorities.  
Fighting VAT fraud is the single gravest accession challenge to a country’s 
customs administration. The government should remain determined to tackle VAT 
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carousel fraud.  Operational activities should be intensified throughout the 
countries and global co-operation should be set in motion. Additionally, the 
government should bring forward additional legislation for a more sophisticated 
VAT system that would entail to minimisation of this serious and intimidating 
VAT fraud. 
4.3 Proposals to tackle VAT Carousel fraud 
4.3.1 Proposals suggested by the EU Commission 
According to the EU Commission , the preconditions for any change to the current 
VAT system are the following: 
 reduce considerably the possibilities for fraud and exclude new important 
fraud risks; 
 generate no disproportionate administrative burdens for traders and the 
authorities; 
 ensure tax neutrality; 
 ensure non-discriminatory treatment in a Member State between both 
national operators and operators established elsewhere. 
Individual member states can act with these broad parameters in order to combat 
VAT carousel fraud. The use of derogation from the general principles of EU VAT 
law which the measures in the UK Finance Act 2006 rely on, provide an 
opportunity for Member States to combat carousel fraud in the short-term.  The 
other strategies proposed by the EU Commission establish a framework to tackle 
the fraud more effectively in the future (UK Parliament report, 2007).  
However, in the report of PwC (2006), it has been declared that the proposals of 
the EU Commission will be helpful but are likely to take time to implement, given 
the requirement for international agreement. Additionally, the Portuguese Tax 
Administration has carried out a study to analyse the impact of the proposed 
measures between companies.  It was concluded that the implementation of these 
measures cause an overall negative impact, increasing the exposure to tax fraud 
risk due to the shifting of tax collection from large companies to small ones, which 
are more numerous and more difficult to control (Portugal Ministry of Finance and 
Public Administration, 2007). 
Moreover, the European Commission on 28 January 2009, adopted a proposal to 
change the VAT Directive (2006/112/EC) in respect to the invoicing rules, based 
on a Communication on the technological developments in the field of electronic 
invoicing. The aim of the proposal is to increase the use of electronic invoicing, 
reduce burdens on business, support small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
and help Member States to tackle fraud. 
4.3.2 Generalised ‘ Reverse – charge’ system 
A generalised reverse charge system would pass the liability for VAT on all 
transactions between businesses onto the buyer, rather than the seller.  VAT would 
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not change hands, and the buyer would be expected to account for the tax to the 
Inland Revenue authorities, and apply it as a credit against sales tax, where this 
would in effect replace VAT with a Sales Tax (Martin, 2007; Gosling, 2007).  
According to the Commission, a reverse charge system provides advantages to 
Member states provided that it is applied in certain economic sectors only, such as 
construction and goods with high value added. This type of system increased the 
receipts of the Member States and most particularly Germany had the benefit of a 
25 per cent reduction of VAT losses as well as Austria had enjoyed positive 
advantages via the use of the reverse-charge system in the area of the construction 
industry (International VAT Association report, 2007; IFS Green Budget report, 
2007).  
However, the difficulty of applying a limited reverse charge to certain products is 
that fraud would likely move onto other goods or services not covered by this 
system (ICAEW report, 2007). Furthermore, studies have shown that a Sales Tax is 
efficient at relatively low rates but is increasingly difficult to administer as rates 
rise (European Union Committee report, 2007).   Cross-border trade would become 
more expensive as organisations would now pay the Sales Tax rate of the country 
of purchase. This mechanism can cause fraudsters to migrate to other sectors, 
notably retail, and is not likely a permanent solution (Madzharova, 2011). 
The generalised reverse-charge generates far too high a level of risk for the receipts 
of the Member States, especially since the concentration of the tax and its payment 
takes place with the retailer (defaulting retailer).  In the French report of the 
Conseil des Prelevement Obligatoires (2007), it was mentioned that tax evasion in 
a country such as the US applying a Sales Tax system, is estimated at about the 
level of 30 per cent.  Extensive reverse charging might help to stem losses from 
VAT carousel frauds, but might expose the VAT to other risks of revenue loss 
through more mundane forms of evasion (Sinn et al, 2004; Keen and Smith, 2007; 
Tumbel, 2007).  Consequently, it seems that this type of proposal is likely to cause 
greater tax evasion than a tax such as VAT. 
4.3.3 Taxing intra-EU transactions 
One of the key weaknesses in the present transitional system is the ability to 
purchase and sell goods and certain services intra-EU, tax free.  This creates one of 
the key characteristics of the menacing carousel fraud, where the opportunity to 
claim fraudulent VAT refunds arises principally because of the break in the VAT 
chain that occurs as a result of the zero-rating of intra-EC exports.  
 
Moreover, in a paper in the December 2006 National Tax Journal, Keen and Smith 
have agreed that a longer-run and durable solution to the problem of MITC fraud 
requires a fundamental redesign of the VAT treatment of international transactions.  
Ending VAT zero-rating for trade between EU member states would sharply 
reduce the scale of refunds and eliminate some of the most tempting opportunities 
for missing trader frauds. 
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In addition, it has been argued that the removal of the zero-rating of intra-EU 
supplies is one which appears to fulfill the basic requirements of simplicity, 
proportionately and legal certainty while maintaining the basis of a fractionated 
payment system (International VAT Association report, 2007). 
On the contrary, Brever and Nam (2009) conferred that VAT fraud can be combat 
by taxing intra-community supplies at a common rate of 15% accompanied by the 
internal correction of input-tax gap between an importer and his own tax liability. 
4.3.4 Fiscal Substitution 
The method consists in choosing one of the economic operators in a chain as being 
the person legally liable for the payment of the VAT.  This operator will request 
payment by his client of two amounts of VAT: The VAT ‘per se’ for the operation 
and the VAT for ‘fiscal substitution’. 
The VAT per se is calculated based on the value of the operation between the 
person liable for the payment of the VAT and his client.  Substitution VAT is 
calculated based on an ‘indicative value’.  The VAT thereby obtained is deducted 
from the operator’s VAT per se.  This difference will be paid by the client to the 
supplier and the supplier in turn pays the tax to the state.  In the case of intra-
community sales the supplier (liable for payment of the VAT) pays the VAT 
directly to the state of destination (International VAT Association report, 2007; 
European Union Committee report, 2007). 
Despite the apparent benefits of this solution, it would require a fundamental 
change to the existing VAT system as it would require significant adaptation to the 
EU’s 27 Member States’ existing legislation and practices in order to operate 
within the EU. 
4.3.5 VAT Grouping 
Article 11 of Directive 2006/112/EC allows for Member States the possibility, after 
consultation with the VAT Committee to introduce into their VAT legislation a 
VAT Grouping measure allowing for taxable persons closely linked by economic 
or financial ties to be treated as a single taxable person (International VAT 
Association report, 2007).  PwC report (2007) for the Commission on the taxation 
of Financial Services, illustrated that 86% of surveyed businesses are reluctant to 
outsource operations because of the potential VAT costs.  If VAT grouping were 
made mandatory for Member states to introduce, this would reduce VAT flows 
between businesses and the inherent risks of fraud.   
It should be renowned that EU agreed on a common payment system as it will 
make transfers across the EU cheap, easy and quick.  The system will apply both 
within the eurozone and to non-euro member states as well as to those new member 
states that have not yet adopted the euro.  Principles for a Payment Services 
Directive have been agreed by ministers to cover transactions conducted by 
businesses and individuals, whether made by credit or debit cards, electronic 
transfers, direct debit, standing orders or cheques (Gosling, 2007). 
4.3.6 Cooperation between revenue services 
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The report by the Controller and Auditor General (2004) explained that one 
mechanism that facilitates VAT communication and coordination is a computerised 
system for automatically exchanging information about VAT registered traders and 
the value of their intra-Community supplies of goods, known as the VAT 
Information Exchange System or VIES. 
Moreover, another technique except VIES to struggle VAT fraud was founded as 
‘Fiscalis 2007’.  This technique is a multiannual activity program of the Committee 
meant to improve and coordinate the indirect taxation of the EU states, and to 
consolidate cooperation between member states. The goal of this method is 
adopting a structured approach allowing European system to function as one single 
administration in order to protect the financial interests of the Community by 
struggling against tax (Cinca, 2008). 
The International VAT Association report (2007) focused on the solutions offered 
by enhanced administrative cooperation, concluding that there is ample scope for 
significant traction in the fight against fraud. The establishment of an internal 
market characterised by free movement of goods between Member states could not 
be guaranteed.  Thus the harmonisation of turnover tax systems is identified as a 
priority (Ahmad and Faris, 2010). 
However, EU expansion has made it politically more difficult to take further steps 
towards closer VAT coordination.  Indeed tax matters including VAT continue to 
be subject to uniformity in the EU which means that every single one of the 
member states has a veto in the legislative process to make further changes to the 
EU VAT framework. 
4.3.7 Technological strategies 
Until 2006 no solution has been considered in relation to a technology based 
administrative proposal.  Ainsworth (2008) initiated a proposal for a limited 
adoption of a digital VAT where it seeks digitisation and certification of the current 
system. He explained that under a certified tax software solution, enterprises would 
be able to (a) assure the tax authority that the VAT is  properly assessed and 
collected and (b) minimise itself from cash flow or other losses arising from an 
audit or investigation based on suspected VAT MITC or carousel fraud 
(Ainsworth, 2010). 
Additionally, China launched a major fiscal reform project called Golden Tax 
Project (GTP) which mandates the use of specific sophisticated information 
technologies to improve compliance with China’s VAT laws.  The Chinese policy 
requires the use of stronger central controls than the EU policy where the Chinese 
GTP strategy might provide a useful model for other developing countries 
struggling with large scale VAT compliance problems (Winn and Zhang, 2010). 
Another report proposed an e-VAT where the essential advantage is that it 
facilitates automatic and electronic collection of the VAT.  The report provided an 
explanation of how the e-VAT system would operate, achieve progressivity and 
deal with the problems of tax evasion (Goldberg, 2010). 
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5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
In conclusion, the high and increasing levels of VAT fraud in the EU, and its 
movement into areas such as services, is beginning to affect Member states’ 
international trade statistics and current account balances, the consequences of 
which require action on a determined and coordinated basis.  Notwithstanding all 
the merits of the existing system, it is clear that something must be done in order to 
reverse the current trend. As Ligthart (2006) stated in his article, ‘what is needed to 
combat VAT fraud is a complete overhaul of the VAT system’. 
It is true that the common system of VAT is under sustained attack by fraudsters; 
there is a strong public interest in the proper administration and collection of tax 
and also in the prosecution of crime.  However, the Achilles’ heel for the fraudsters 
is the point at which the VAT is extracted.  Any changes in the VAT system design 
need to be pursued through broad consensus.  The overall picture is complicated by 
the unprecedented enlargement of the EU with the accession of new members with 
broadly varying levels of administrative capacity in handling conventional evasion 
and organised fraud.  It is suggested that national authorities should consider how 
to implement and share best practice and profiles to combat VAT carousel fraud 
with other national governments.   
Finally, no perfect system seems to exist that can work the miracle of 
distinguishing easily fraudsters from law law-abiding taxpayers and delivering 
deserved punishment on the ones while shielding the others from the tax 
authorities’ errors of judgment.  A trade-off is necessary between the interests of 
business and those of the administration, based on a clear understanding of its net 
benefit.  An understanding between member states and European institutions is 
necessary to turn the balance into a clear benefit for everyone, not just for each 
member state, but also for enterprises and entrepreneurs acting within the EU. 
An introduction of an EU modern IT management system is crucial.  Cooperation 
among countries is imperative as it can reduce the level of the underground 
economy. 
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